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RAND

*Planning Reserve  
Mobilization*

*Inferences from Operation  
Desert Shield*

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*Prepared for the  
United States Army*

**Arroyo Center**

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## PREFACE

This report describes RAND observations of the initial call-up of Army reserve units for Operation Desert Shield (ODS), the U.S. force buildup during the Persian Gulf war. It identifies problems and issues raised by ODS that could affect the Army's use of reserve forces in future contingencies and summarizes research issues that deserve further analysis as the Army is reconfigured for the post-Cold War environment.

This work was begun in response to a request from the office of the Army Chief of Staff, which asked RAND to examine issues of transportation, joint systems, reserve force utilization, and support structures during the initial phase of ODS.<sup>1</sup> Observations of reserve forces were conducted between August and October 1990 as part of an ongoing Arroyo Center project on "Force Structures and the Transition to War," sponsored by U.S. Army Forces Command. That project examined a set of alternative Army force structures, including active and reserve configurations, that could meet future wartime requirements for a range of scenarios. When ODS began, the project undertook to observe the call-up of reserve units to collect empirical information about the mobilization process in contingency operations.

<sup>1</sup>See Lippiatt et al. (1992a and 1992b) for quantitative analysis of reserve unit preparation times based on ODS experience and Stucker and Kameny (forthcoming) for a discussion of deployment planning issues.

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## SUMMARY

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### INTRODUCTION

Operation Desert Shield (ODS) occasioned the first call-up of U.S. reserve forces in more than twenty years. Soon after Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990, the United States deployed Army active component (AC) units and began to call Army reserve components (RC) units to duty. During the initial phase of ODS (August through October 1990), the Army called more than 22,000 RC personnel, representing 221 units that were either deployed overseas or used to fill Continental United States (CONUS) requirements to include critical slots vacated by deploying AC units.<sup>1</sup> The types of RC units mobilized were those devoted to support functions needed early in the deployment, such as military police, chemical, transportation, linguistic, medical, ordnance, and quartermaster units. In some cases the appropriate unit types existed only in the RC.

In the future, U.S. military operations are more likely to resemble such a contingency as ODS than a large-scale war like the European scenarios that previously occupied center stage in military planning. The experience of ODS may therefore provide some clues or signposts pointing to how the Army should organize and plan for the future. Moreover, as the size of the Army AC declines, RC forces are likely to become relatively more important, particularly for certain

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<sup>1</sup>During the initial phase (through about October 1990), the United States deployed a defensive and reinforcing force to Saudi Arabia. Starting in November, it began a heavier buildup to permit offensive operations.

types of units. This report, initially commissioned by the office of the Army Chief of Staff, examines the early RC mobilization experience during ODS to see what lessons it may demonstrate.

Our observations came from a range of visits and interviews with Army personnel involved in the reserve call-up, including visits to Forces Command (Fort McPherson, Georgia), XVIII Corps Headquarters (Fort Bragg, North Carolina), III Corps Headquarters (Fort Hood, Texas), 6th U.S. Army Headquarters (Presidio of San Francisco, California), 3rd U.S. Army Headquarters (Fort McPherson, Georgia), 2nd U.S. Army Headquarters (Fort Gillem, Georgia), and several mobilization stations where reserve units were assembled and trained for ODS deployment (including Fort Bragg, North Carolina; Fort Hood and Fort Sam Houston, Texas; and Fort Ord, California). These visits took place from August through October 1990. The information presented is based on observations during the first weeks of the call-up, which is likely to be the most critical period of any deployment.

## **DESERT SHIELD DEPARTURES FROM PAST RESERVE PLANNING**

The events of ODS unfolded differently than envisioned in previous planning for use of RC forces. In the past, most Army planning for use of RC units had been based on a large-scale conflict. It was widely believed that many RC units, combat and noncombat, would deploy along with their AC counterparts in such an event. Typically, planners expected relatively long warning times and a sequence of mobilization actions including the presidential "200K call-up" (up to 200,000 reservists) followed by partial and then full mobilization.

In contrast, in ODS there was little warning, and there was no specific deployment plan or plan for using reserves in such a contingency. Combat and certain support units were needed in theater very early. Given the speed with which the theater needed combat power, RC combat units were not used. However, the theater commander did need some support units—some of these could be found only in the RC—along with individual reservists with specialized



skills. These circumstances led to a presidential order calling up a limited number of RC troops under the 200K authority.<sup>2</sup>

On the whole, these unexpected events did not seriously impede the mobilization of RC units. Our own observations, combined with the reports we received from personnel at the various headquarters involved in the mobilization, indicated that the initial phases of the mobilization proceeded fairly smoothly. By "fairly smoothly" we mean that while there were some problems, they did not cause significant delays in the availability of RC units or in their deployment.<sup>3</sup> Nonetheless, the experience points to some adjustments that may be desirable to better prepare the Army for similar types of contingencies in the future, and to some issues that should be addressed in the longer term as Army missions and structures are changed.

## **SPECIFIC ISSUES FOR CONTINGENCIES**

Future contingencies are likely to erupt quickly and require that the call-up and mobilization process work smoothly from the beginning. Based on our observations of the initial stages of ODS, we identified the following issues that appear relevant for future operations.

### **Reviewing the 200K Call-up Mechanism**

Some initial problems in the ODS call-up grew out of the previous planning on partial and full mobilization. For example, because the early phases of ODS operated under the limited 200K call-up authority, RC units experienced some difficulties in granting pay and benefits, processing personnel, and using data systems geared for a larger call-up. Cross-leveling, a key process in preparing RC units for deployment, would have been streamlined if the Army had had access to Individual Ready Reserve personnel, particularly for units that were needed very early, such as port operators and trans-

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<sup>2</sup>Subsequent to the period of this study, additional authority for calling RC units was granted on November 14, 1990, and on December 1, 1990. On January 19, 1991, partial mobilization was declared.

<sup>3</sup>Subsequent RAND analyses of mobilization times for RC support units also verified that most such units were prepared quickly enough to meet the timetables expected of them (Lippiatt et al., 1992b).

portation specialists. The requirement to call units as units also posed some problems. For example, the Army and the other services eventually called some individuals who were parts of units (e.g., linguists and physicians in particular specialties), but only after constructing "derivative" subunits that contained the necessary personnel. To avoid numerous procedural problems like these and to speed deployments in the future, the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Army should review procedures for use during a 200K call-up and consider requesting legislative changes, such as more flexible authority to call small numbers of units and members of the Individual Ready Reserve.

### **Measures to Reduce Assembly and Movement Time**

During ODS, mobilization of some units would have been streamlined and speeded up if they had previously completed certain routine preparatory actions, such as over-40 physical exams, preparation of eye glasses, and dental treatment. In addition, some units required additional personnel because their rosters included significant numbers of "nondeployable" personnel, many of whom were people who had not yet completed initial training. The Army does not have a reliable accounting mechanism showing the number and characteristics of such personnel, such as the account for "transients, trainees, holdees, and students" in the AC. The Army should undertake analyses to establish the magnitude of such problems and identify which of the above bottlenecks and personnel shortfalls could be cost-effectively rectified by changes in peacetime operations and which should be postponed until mobilization.

### **Training Activities at Mobilization Station**

We observed substantial variations in training given to RC units at the mobilization station, many of which appeared to be driven by the resources available at the particular station or the individual views of the personnel overseeing the training. While the process of equipping and training individuals appeared consistent and well spelled out, collective training for support units was uneven. Guidelines should be developed to specify postmobilization training activities, recognizing the scenario needs and attributes of the unit, such as

where it is to be deployed, training status, and the degree of risk to be assumed in the particular contingency.

A related problem is the potential absence of active-duty trainers and support personnel at an installation serving as an RC mobilization station. This was not widespread during ODS, but it did appear, for example, at Fort Bragg, which received RC units for training even though the AC division located at Fort Bragg had already deployed to the theater. During ODS this problem was handled in an ad hoc fashion, but it illustrates the need for planning and resources to provide AC trainers and support personnel (or suitable substitutes) for RC units that need significant postmobilization training.

### **Sustaining an Extended Deployment**

During the early period of the call-up (before partial mobilization was declared) there arose a question as to the proper role of the RC in sustaining the forces in the theater. If ODS had evolved into a long-term deployment of forces in the Middle East and partial mobilization not been declared, there was serious question as to how the force was to be sustained. Under the 200K call-up, RC personnel can only remain on active duty for up to 180 days. What then? Would it be appropriate to call up additional RC units to replace those units returned back to the CONUS and separated from active duty? In some cases, there would not be sufficient units of the correct type to replace those in the theater. Particularly as the AC declines in size, it is important to examine the role of RC units in maintaining forward-deployed forces over an extended period of time and the mechanisms for supporting such a role.

### **Flexibility and Expectations in Use of RC Units**

Past planning and training programs created a public expectation, inside and outside the Army, that any contingency calling for the deployment of forces would automatically involve the use of RC units. In ODS, however, events unfolded differently. Many RC units, especially combat units, did not deploy with active units as planned. In some cases, parts of units were called (such as linguists and physicians in certain specialties). And some units were used in ways that were different from what they had expected (such as medical units

assigned to fill vacancies at CONUS hospitals from which the regular staff had deployed). Although this may be an inevitable result of contingency operations, in the future it will be necessary to prepare unit members, both AC and RC, for a range of scenarios and to convey the concept that training and unit relationships in peacetime may be changed abruptly in a contingency.

### **LONGER-TERM ISSUES FOR THE FUTURE ARMY**

Actions on the above concerns could speed and smooth reserve deployment in future contingencies like ODS. However, the ODS experience also pointed up broader issues about the design of the future Army.

#### **Planning for a Downsized Army**

The early stages of ODS mobilization were executed with few problems in part because the operation was mounted from an Army with about 744,000 AC and 756,000 Selected Reserve personnel. The Army in the future will be smaller and probably less robust (e.g., it will have fewer units of each particular type). In ODS, the Army was able to draw from a large pool of units, AC and RC, selecting the most ready unit or the unit that best matched the requirements. In addition, the Army had the opportunity to cross level among units, drawing resources from a large number of sources.

In many cases, this cross-leveling was extensive. For instance, one unit that we observed had 71 personnel assigned at the time of alert, out of a wartime requirement of 132; it arrived at the mobilization station with 88 assigned because of cross-leveling, and it reached a strength of 125 during predeployment training at the mobilization station. In the future, the Army will have fewer total units, fewer personnel, and possibly a smaller amount of equipment. Decisions about the size and structure of the future Army should consider the resulting limitations on inventories of units and individuals, and whether different resourcing policies will be needed to avoid the necessity of extensive cross-leveling in the new environment.

### **Special Treatment of Very Early Deploying RC Units**

Given the way the Army was structured before ODS, it needed access to some RC units and personnel very early in the deployment, primarily such specialists as port operators, linguists, medical specialists, and water purification personnel. Although we did not identify any specific instances in which the ODS in-theater posture was adversely affected by a delay in mobilizing these RC units, it is possible that such problems could occur in future contingencies. Because of such concerns, many in the Army would prefer to keep very early deploying units in the AC force structure if feasible.

This issue needs to be addressed for a variety of unit types and possible scenarios. There are some types of units that would be very expensive or infeasible to maintain on active status because their functions are infrequently needed in peacetime. If such units are placed in the RC, however, it may be necessary to take special steps to provide additional resources to particular units and to provide special authority for calling these units.

### **Planning for Use of Reserve Forces in Future Contingencies**

ODS is only one of many contingencies for which the Army may need to prepare. A different scenario or contingency may impose very different demands on the Army and its ability to deliver forces. As the United States moves into an era with changing defense requirements and constrained resources, the defense planning process needs to systematically consider the range of such scenarios and the demands they may impose on both the RC and AC forces.

In the past, RC units were designed and trained primarily with a European war in mind. In that context, the Army knew the nature of the enemy, location, and types of military requirements, and it could assume that in the event of war it would have immediate access to a wide range of units. In the future, however, it seems likely that the Army will be oriented toward quite different and more uncertain contingencies. Some of these may unfold very quickly, placing a premium on quick response for certain early deploying RC units. Timing may become even more critical if mobilization is delayed (for example, while diplomatic avenues are pursued). Thus, planning for RC and AC structures needs to consider a variety of factors that have

previously played only tangential roles, such as the requirements for specialized units in different contingencies and in varying theaters, the speed with which RC units would be needed under those scenarios, the timing and type of mobilization authority that is likely to be available, and the likely duration of the contingency. In addition, the design of the Army's future active-reserve mix needs to provide, in a cost-effective way, a capability to mobilize for a large-scale conflict for which a relatively long warning can be expected. In this planning context, the ODS experience provides important empirical information but should be seen as only one example of the missions and circumstances that the U.S. military will confront in the future.

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## **BACKGROUND**

Since the advent of the "Total Force Policy" in the 1970s, reserve forces have played a crucial role in U.S. defense planning. For some time, Army units of the reserve components (RC) were expected to deploy along with and alongside active units early in a European conflict and to play a role in any large-scale contingency operation. Until 1990, however, that role had not been tested; no RC units were called up during that period, until the deployment for Operation Desert Shield (ODS). Thus, ODS provided a unique experience in recent history. From this experience, one may be able to draw inferences about the use of reserve forces in contingencies like ODS, providing a basis for specifying RC and active component (AC) roles and structures in the future Army.

The RC—including both the U.S. Army National Guard (ARNG) and the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR)—became an increasingly important part of Army force structure during the 1980s. In 1989, the RC made up 50 percent of the Army personnel strength and provided 53 percent of the force structure. Between 1981 and 1989 the AC personnel strength declined slightly (1 percent), while that of the RC increased by 146,700 (24 percent).

During that period, the ARNG, oriented toward combat forces such as infantry and armor, increased personnel strength by 13 percent and force structure by 10 percent. The USAR, oriented more toward such combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) missions as health services, communications, transportation, and engi-



neering, increased personnel strength by 31 percent and force structure spaces by 14 percent. The Selected Reserve strength of the USAR grew from 186,000 to 310,000, an increase of 55 percent. Together, in 1989 the two reserve components provided 67 percent of the Army's wartime CS/CSS capability.

These developments occurred against the backdrop of a long-standing debate over the mix of active and reserve forces. While Department of Defense (DoD) budget constraints and relaxation of tensions in Europe tend to press toward active-force reductions that could lead to an even greater prominence for reserves, critics have voiced concern about the dependence of Army forces on reserve elements, especially in the CSS area. However, until the ODS deployment, this debate took place without the nation's having mobilized the RC since the announcement of the Total Force Policy. Indeed, before ODS, a U.S. president had never exercised the authority to call up, for a limited time, units and members of the Selected Reserve without a declaration of war or national emergency.

The events of ODS changed all this and provided a record of experience that may help the Army better understand the role of RC units during the early phase of contingency operations. This report is an attempt to capture and exploit the experience during the initial phase of ODS, to see what that experience might tell us about the role of the RC in the future Army and what the proper AC-RC mix might be to deliver the required forces for future contingencies. This report, however, is not intended to provide answers. It is intended only to describe what took place in the early phase of ODS—so far as that could be done while the action was still in progress—and to identify issues that deserve attention in analysis of future force structures.

## RESEARCH OBJECTIVE

This research effort was initiated to support two separate projects: (1) a project for the Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) addressing long-term Army active-reserve mix issues; and (2) a broader, but near-term, effort requested by the Army Chief of Staff. The broader project was to describe and examine ODS to determine possible changes to improve force projection capability for future contingencies.

cies—situations that are widely viewed as defining “the new world of the Army.” Particular interest was expressed in three areas: How should joint systems be improved? How should the Army be reconfigured to respond to future contingencies? And what is the effect on doctrine of the ODS experience? A special RAND effort was initiated to capture the early ODS experience in these and related areas and to lay a foundation for analysis of possible future contingency operations.

## **APPROACH**

This report is based primarily on interviews conducted with personnel at units and at headquarters (HQ) activities who were participating in ODS between August 30, 1990, and October 3, 1990. To support this portion of the effort, our visits included elements at selected mobilization stations (Fort Sam Houston, Fort Hood, Fort Bragg, Fort Gordon, Fort Ord, and Fort Polk), reserve units at home stations as well as mobilization stations, and discussions with participants at HQ FORSCOM, HQ 2nd Army, HQ 5th Army, HQ 6th Army, HQ XVIII Corps, HQ III Corps, and the Health Services Command.

These visits, discussions, and interviews took place as the operation was unfolding, and thus the individuals involved did not have the benefit of reflection or knowledge about how all events eventually concluded. This was particularly true for the process of mobilizing and deploying RC units, a process that was still in the midmobilization phase during the period of our visits and observation. An area that appears to be a major issue on one day may pale on the next as it is replaced by a new issue or problem. This should be recognized as a limitation of the base of information reported here. It is expected, however, that the effort will help to capture and exploit the experience of ODS and to identify the problems that, though solved as the call-up progressed, were encountered during the initial days of the first call-up of reserve forces in many years.

## **OUTLINE OF THE DOCUMENT**

The next chapter describes the planning environment for ODS and the process used in selecting AC and RC units for ODS tasking. In

**Chapter Three we describe the mobilization process and the activities and resources at the units' home stations and mobilization stations. We then, in Chapter Four, review the training and validation process used in preparing RC units for deployment. In Chapter Five, we review our observations of ODS and highlight the key RC issues likely to be important for the future Army.**

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## PLANNING FOR USE OF RESERVISTS

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### PLANNING BEFORE OPERATION DESERT SHIELD

Planned and actual use of RC forces prior to ODS fell into two categories. The first was the case of small contingencies in which there was no call-up of reserves, but in which reserve volunteers were used to meet requirements where insufficient numbers of personnel with critical skills were available in the AC, as was the case in Operation Just Cause (the operation in Panama in 1989). The second was the case of large contingencies (typically greater than two corps). For such contingencies, planners assumed a longer warning and mobilization period (relative to ODS) and envisioned a limited call-up of less than 200,000 RC personnel (the "200K" stage) as only a preparatory step before immediately moving to partial mobilization and deployment.<sup>1</sup>

For several reasons, partial mobilization was an important aspect of the previous planning for large contingencies. For example, it was assumed that partial mobilization would be authorized prior to commencement of operations. In the 200K stage, as a step to partial mobilization, the plans envisioned using reservists to augment mo-

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<sup>1</sup>There are several statutory provisions for calling up reserve units; the most commonly discussed provisions are the "200K" (200,000) call-up, "partial mobilization," and "full mobilization." Title 10 USC, Section 673b, provides authority for the president to activate up to 200,000 members of the Selected Reserve for an operational mission for up to 180 days at times other than war or national emergency. The other provisions, which permit more extensive call-ups, require a declaration of national emergency and/or other extraordinary steps.

bilization stations, to provide terminal operations and medical support in the CONUS, and to provide early RC deployers to the theater to support the reception and onward movement of forces and equipment as they arrived in the theater.<sup>2</sup> At the stage of partial mobilization, they envisioned calling up the main body of the RC, designated to support a particular planning scenario. These plans provided the basis for aligning AC and RC units into their CAPSTONE<sup>3</sup> relations to focus training, readiness, and mobilization programs on their primary wartime mission.

### PLANNING FOR OPERATION DESERT SHIELD

The initial phase of ODS had characteristics in between the small and large contingencies discussed above. The force requirement was certainly larger than that for Operation Just Cause, but smaller than previously expected for major contingencies. Moreover, the 200K reserve call-up was not executed immediately when the operation began, and a partial mobilization was not declared until January 19, 1991, five months after ODS began.

The crisis leading to ODS began with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990. The U.S. president authorized deployment of forces on August 6. However, presidential authority for the 200K call-up was not granted until August 22, approximately 15 days after the first active-duty forces deployed. Prior to the RC call-up, two AC brigades were designated by the Department of the Army to "plus up" the two heavy divisions that were targeted for use in ODS. Before the president authorized deployment of any force, the 197th Separate Infantry Brigade was designated to deploy with the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized).

The "Tiger" brigade from the 2nd Armored Division, which was in the process of deactivating, was assigned to the 1st Cavalry Division. The "Tiger" brigade was assigned on or about August 8. In other larger scenarios with longer warning and mobilization times, these

<sup>2</sup>U.S. Army Forces Command and Headquarters, Department of the Army, October 1989, p. 19.

<sup>3</sup>Under the CAPSTONE program, RC units are designated according to the primary higher-echelon unit with which they would go to war.

same divisions would have been rounded out with ARNG brigades in their CAPSTONE trace.<sup>4</sup>

During the first days of ODS, FORSCOM attempted to use active-duty units to fulfill the unfolding requirement as generated by U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). On August 8, FORSCOM identified linguists as the first active-duty shortfall, and on August 12 the FORSCOM J5 staff began identifying RC units to fill ODS requirements in expectation of receiving call-up authority. Other CS and CSS requirements that could not be filled from active units were subsequently identified.

Following the presidential decision to use reservists, the Secretary of Defense promulgated call-up authority on August 23. Thereafter, requirements were sourced using CAPSTONE alignments and affiliations from previous operational plans as long as the unit could meet the latest arrival date (LAD) requirement and had at least a minimum rating of C-3 as reported in SORTS (the Joint Chiefs of Staff Status of Resources and Training System).

If an RC unit was not available from a CAPSTONE trace or the unit was not C-3, the FORSCOM planners went to the functional managers to identify the appropriate RC unit from outside the trace. The FORSCOM functional managers based their selection on the relative readiness of the units. In some cases, units at C-4 were selected if they could be brought to C-3 through cross-leveling and other activities. Although this process seemed to be adequate for ODS, an important issue to be examined for future RC planning is whether some units should be given special consideration in resourcing to ensure that higher overall readiness is maintained for early deployers to contingencies.

One important issue is the extent to which CENTCOM may have been short of capability during the early days before the first RC units arrived in theater. The very early RC deployments to ODS were typically CSS and included such units as movement control, cargo handlers, public affairs, linguists, water purification and distribution, and postal. To the extent the theater was short of critical CSS capa-

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<sup>4</sup>The CAPSTONE trace shows all of the lower-echelon units that are expected to deploy with a particular higher-echelon organization.

bility that was required to receive and support the deployment of active-duty combat forces, we may, in the future, want to examine alternative call-up mechanisms for these types of units that do not require a presidential 200K action. Typically, these units require little mobilization and train-up time, and, in many cases, their skills are such that if they were in the AC they would have little to do in peacetime. Such alternative call-up mechanisms could be restricted to very low numbers and very specific unit types. The alternative to such revised call-up mechanisms for contingencies similar to ODS may be to place these critical units in the AC.

Other RC units were called up early to replace active-duty units already deployed. These included garrison units to support mobilization, hospital units to replace active-duty professionals who were deployed with their medical units, and port and transportation units to support the deployment.

The initial force requirements identified for ODS were smaller than those expected for a major contingency. As a result, the Army did not need and did not mobilize many of the RC units that might have been used in other scenarios. Initially, there were assumptions about the availability of host-nation support that may have further reduced the requirement for certain types of theater support units. At the time of the Secretary of Defense's initial authorization for the 200K call-up on August 23, 1991, it was estimated that the CENTCOM and CONUS (Continental United States) backfill requirements could be met with 25,000 Army personnel. By this time, all existing requirements for combatants had been sourced from the AC, and the Secretary of Defense authorized 25,000 to be called from CS and CSS RC units.

The limited RC requirement created some problems initially in that, in some cases, only partial units were needed. For example, the Army needed only Arabic-speaking linguists from selected military intelligence battalions. Similarly, it needed only the professionals from the hospital units to backfill the positions of those active-duty professionals sent with the deploying units; other support personnel assigned to the hospital units were not required. This problem was solved by creating partial or derivative unit identification codes (UICs). In the future, the Army should consider options that allow

both unit membership and individual accessibility (such as in the Individual Mobilization Augmentee system).

Under the 200K call-up authority, reserve personnel can be kept on active duty for up to 180 days (unless partial mobilization is initiated, requiring a declaration of national emergency). During the first two months of ODS, partial mobilization had not been authorized, and FORSCOM was facing the possibility of having to replace RC units within the 180-day limit. There was agreement that under the 200K call-up authority the 180 days did not start until a unit was mobilized. FORSCOM was, however, attempting to identify RC units to replace those reaching the 180-day limit. The Army structure did not contain enough of some critical unit types, such as water purification and distribution, movement control, petroleum handling, and ammunition handling, to support such a rotation. If units could not be found, FORSCOM was considering retraining RC volunteers as replacements. To avoid such situations in the future, the Army should consider requesting legislation that would provide more flexibility in the time allowed for such a limited call-up without declaring a national emergency, especially in cases where no hostilities have commenced. Again, an alternative would be to put such units in the AC.

## **EXPECTATIONS AND REALITIES DURING ODS**

As discussed above, the planning and execution of ODS differed from virtually all previous planning scenarios and mobilization exercises. In part, this resulted from the nation's previous defense planning focus on large contingencies in determining the role of RC forces and their structural and training relationships with AC units. For the most part, these contingencies called for partial or full mobilization prior to the deployment of any force.

As it actually unfolded, ODS was executed under a different set of circumstances and assumptions, and in a different way than most previous deliberate planning would have indicated. This meant that many expectations were not met. Numerous observers have pointed to the fact that many units did not deploy with their CAPSTONE trace (e.g., two roundout brigades, the 48th and 155th, and some XVIII Corps RC CSS units) and that the Army called parts of units rather than entire units (e.g., medical professionals and linguists).



The issue posed here is not whether the level of RC tasking was appropriate, or whether the expectations were correctly founded. The issue is the discontinuity between expectations and execution, resulting in disappointment and controversy when RC units were not called as expected. For example, some have suggested that ODS events could have a negative impact on future reserve recruiting and retention. The Army needs to better articulate the need for flexibility for reserve forces in contingencies and to convey the concept that in a contingency-oriented force, peacetime training relationships established through deliberate planning will probably change at execution. In this case, the Army, along with the rest of the nation, was caught in the rapid change in emphasis and thinking from a focus on a large-scale conflict to a focus on contingencies. With the large and rapid change expected to occur in the structure and mission focus of the Army over the next few years, it becomes even more important that all elements of the Army—AC, RC, civilian, and contract—understand their respective roles, including the possible changes in those roles, so that misplaced expectations and their potential effects are minimized.

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**MOBILIZATION OF RESERVE FORCES**


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The mobilization of reserve forces units includes five phases: preparatory, alert, mobilization at home station, movement to mobilization station, and operational readiness improvement. For units deploying overseas, the last phase of mobilization is followed by the three stages of deployment: movement from mobilization station to the port of embarkation, movement from the port of embarkation to the port of debarkation, and the movement from the port of debarkation to the staging area. This report deals only with the mobilization phases and does not discuss the deployment phase of the operation. These phases and main events in the mobilization of reserve units are depicted in Figure 1.

The first phase (preparatory) concerns those activities RC units accomplish at home station during peacetime to plan, train, and accomplish their mobilization mission. The activities include administrative and personnel activities such as maintaining personnel,




Figure 1—Five Phases of the Mobilization Process

finance and medical records, preparing wills and family care plans, and accomplishing physical examinations and immunizations. The unit conducts training to attain and sustain individual and collective skills needed to accomplish its mobilization mission. Other activities include maintaining unit equipment and planning for mobilization and movement of the unit to the mobilization station.

The alert phase begins when a unit receives notice of a pending order to active duty and concludes when the unit enters federal service. Upon alert the unit begins administrative and processing actions. Unit members are alerted, records are screened, and other actions are initiated to prepare for mobilization.

Mobilization at home station begins with entry into active duty and ends with the unit moving to the mobilization station or to the port of embarkation. Activities include assembling all unit members, updating Unit Status Report (USR) data, conducting training, reviewing mobilization station support requirements, and preparing to move. Thereafter, the unit moves to the mobilization station, normally by road or rail.

The operational readiness improvement phase of the mobilization process begins with the arrival at the mobilization station and concludes when the unit is evaluated as ready for deployment. Normally the goal of this phase is to meet the minimum deployment criteria as soon as possible; but it may also be to attain mission capability as time and situation permit or to prepare for unit fragmentation. During this phase unit members complete the transition to active duty and undergo preparation for overseas movement (POM). These events include completing personnel and finance actions (updating records and converting to the AC personnel and finance system) and meeting medical and dental requirements (physical examinations, dental treatment, immunizations, etc.). In addition, the unit completes such operational requirements as preparing battle books and standard operating procedures, establishes plans for linking up personnel and equipment in the theater, and in general prepares for combat operations. Finally, the unit completes individual and collective training required to meet deployment criteria. Equipment is prepared for movement, security briefings are completed, and the USR is updated. This phase is finished when the unit is validated for deployment. During the subsequent deployment stage, the unit

moves from its mobilization station to a port of embarkation, to a port of debarkation in the theater, and on to the area of operations in the theater.

### ALERTING UNITS

In ODS, the president authorized the call-up of Selected Reserve forces under authority of Title 10 USC, Section 673b (commonly known as the "200K call-up"), on August 22, 1990.<sup>1</sup> This was the first time the authority had been exercised since it was first enacted in 1976 (Public Law 94-286). This authority enables the president to call up as many as 200,000 members of the Selected Reserve for up to 90 days, with provision to extend the call-up an additional 90 days if required.

The first units were formally alerted beginning on August 24, 1990. Units were subsequently called up in increments, with the first increment on August 27 and subsequent increments on September 2, 12, 20, 25, and 28. As of October 10 (the end of the period included in this analysis), there were units on alert for possible call-up in future increments.<sup>2</sup>

During our interviews with officials at FORSCOM and its various subordinate commands, it was reported that there was some confusion in the early period of the call-up, because units were alerted one by one and in increments phased over time, as opposed to all at once. Previous command post exercises (CPXs) and the planning for mobilization assumed all units to be called under the 200K authority would be alerted at one time and called to active duty at one time. It was further assumed that this step was in preparation for going al-

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<sup>1</sup>Section 673b was first enacted in May 1976 under Public Law 94-286 and authorized the call-up of 50,000 Selected Reservists for up to 90 days. The authority was amended twice. Public Law 96-584 in 1980 increased the call-up to 100,000, and Public Law 99-661 in 1986 increased the call-up to 200,000 and provided for a 90-day extension to the 90-day time limit, for a total of 180 days active service.

<sup>2</sup>During subsequent phases of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm (ODS/S), there were additional units called for a total, according to data obtained from FORSCOM, of 1,045 RC units activated for service in CONUS, Europe, or Southwest Asia. A total of 145,460 RC personnel, including those ordered to active duty with their units and those ordered to duty as individuals, were activated during ODS/S.

most immediately to partial mobilization. This did not happen in ODS.

In some cases, the phasing of the alert and call-up, and the turbulence in the time-phase force deployment list, reportedly interfered with efforts to improve unit readiness in expectation of that unit being alerted or, after being alerted, called to active duty. Because units were unsure who would be called next, this may have slowed cross-leveling (movement of resources between units), which would have been done to improve the readiness of selected units. In other cases resources were transferred between units to improve a unit's readiness status, after which the selection of units changed, leaving the wrong unit with possession of the scarce resource.

The cross-leveling strategy was further confounded by Army policy prohibiting cross-leveling between units from the time the unit is alerted to the time it reaches the mobilization station. For ODS, this policy was waived and cross-leveling was permitted at home station. During the initial stages of the ODS mobilization, there was some uncertainty about which rules applied. While a source of confusion, the above problems appeared to have been resolved early and had had little affect on the availability of the units or their deployment dates.

Cross-leveling was used to improve unit resource readiness. For example, in one unit visited, personnel available to fill critical positions were transferred from their higher headquarters unit. At the time it was alerted, the unit was short 27 officers as a result of a freeze on accessions that had existed prior to ODS. Concern on the part of the unit's headquarters was created because that unit had also been alerted for possible call-up, and the unit needed to maintain its readiness. Another unit visited was C-4 for personnel and C-3 for equipment at the time it was alerted. The unit's wartime personnel requirement was 132; it was authorized 109 (ALO 1 for officers and ALO 3 for enlisted),<sup>3</sup> with 71 assigned. It arrived at the mobilization station with 88 assigned (C-3 for personnel) as a result of cross-leveling actions by the ARCOM (Army Reserve Command) and

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<sup>3</sup>ALO (Authorized Level of Organization) establishes the authorized strength and equipment levels for units (e.g., ALO 1 is 100 percent, ALO 2 is approximately 90 percent, and ALO 3 is approximately 80 percent).

CONUSA (Continental U.S. Army). At the time we visited the unit during its predeployment training at the mobilization station, it had been provided 37 fillers from a variety of sources (other units in this unit's chain of command, U.S. Army Reserve Forces Schools, etc.), and its strength was at 125 assigned.

Many units received such assistance, augmenting their personnel, equipment, and training during the time they were on alert and at the mobilization station. One unit, for example, was reequipped with all new five-ton trucks directly from the factory while at its mobilization station. Other units were to join up with new equipment in theater.

Units were alerted and called up in increments. Tables 1, 2, and 3 summarize the number of units of each type, whether deploying or CONUS-based, and the number of personnel for each type of unit by increment.<sup>4</sup> Increment 1 was composed primarily of reservists needed to backfill CONUS installations and replace AC units deployed in the initial phase of ODS. These included medical, military police, and garrison functions. Increment 1 also included a limited number of reservists for deployment. These reservists included military intelligence, public affairs, and transportation personnel, for example. Increments 2 and 3a were, on the other hand, overwhelmingly support personnel needed in theater to support AC combat elements deployed there.

For the most part, the alerting of units seemed to go well, and no significant problems were identified. For the future, however, there may still be reason for concern. It is possible that events worked out smoothly only because there were many units and a rich array of resources upon which the Army could draw. Since the RC units evidently depended extensively on cross-leveling resources (even during the alert phase), it is important to establish the degree to which cross-leveling will be needed in the future, and whether such additional resources will be available in a future, smaller Army.

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<sup>4</sup>Data were obtained from the Mobilization Station Planning System (MSPS) at FORSCOM. For a description of the system see U.S. Forces Command, 1987.

**Table 1**  
**Reserve Component Units and Personnel Mobilized During ODS:**  
**Increment 1**

Unit Type		Number of Units	Authorized Personnel
Adjutant general	Deployed	1	120
	CONUS	1	217
Composite services	Deployed	3	217
	CONUS	1	36
U.S. Army garrison	Deployed	0	0
	CONUS	3	972
Judge advocate general	Deployed	1	9
	CONUS	0	0
Medical	Deployed	0	0
	CONUS	11	1,644
Military intelligence	Deployed	5	113
	CONUS	0	0
Military police	Deployed	0	0
	CONUS	1	67
Ordnance	Deployed	0	0
	CONUS	1	43
Public affairs	Deployed	2	53
	CONUS	0	0
Quartermaster	Deployed	3	48
	CONUS	0	0
Transportation	Deployed	18	202
	CONUS	7	693
Total Deployed		33	762
Total CONUS		25	3,672
Total		58	4,434

### HOME STATION ACTIVITIES

Based on the units visited and persons interviewed, mobilization and processing at home station seemed to flow smoothly. Guidance and planning in the FORSCOM Mobilization and Deployment Planning System (FORMDEPS)<sup>5</sup> envisioned decentralized execution of a partial or full mobilization. ODS mobilization, on the other hand, was

<sup>5</sup>See U.S. Forces Command, 1987.

**Table 2**  
**Reserve Component Units and Personnel Mobilized During ODS:**  
**Increment 2**

Unit Type		Number of Units	Authorized Personnel
Adjutant general	Deployed	2	89
	CONUS	0	0
Chemical	Deployed	7	657
	CONUS	0	0
Composite services	Deployed	26	4,056
	CONUS	1	215
Engineers	Deployed	1	12
	CONUS	0	0
Judge advocate general	Deployed	3	23
	CONUS	0	0
Logistics	Deployed	1	348
	CONUS	0	0
Medical	Deployed	0	0
	CONUS	4	208
Military history	Deployed	0	0
	CONUS	1	3
Military intelligence	Deployed	3	20
	CONUS	0	0
Military police	Deployed	14	1,934
	CONUS	1	176
Ordnance	Deployed	5	1,006
	CONUS	0	0
Quartermaster	Deployed	21	1,450
	CONUS	0	0
Transportation	Deployed	45	3,732
	CONUS	0	0
Total Deployed		128	13,327
Total CONUS		7	602
Total		135	13,929

supported by centralized planning and execution of a 200K call-up. Still, much of the planning and many procedures were still applicable.

Each unit was completing its processing (records review, ID cards for dependents, uniform issue, and training) during the roughly three



**Table 3**  
**Reserve Component Units and Personnel Mobilized During ODS:**  
**Increment 3a**

Unit Type		Number of Units	Authorized Personnel
Army security	Deployed	1	243
	CONUS	0	0
Composite services	Deployed	5	1,071
	CONUS	0	0
Engineers	Deployed	1	16
	CONUS	0	0
Quartermaster	Deployed	8	653
	CONUS	0	0
Transportation	Deployed	13	2,015
	CONUS	0	0
Total Deployed		28	3,998
Total CONUS		0	0
Total		28	3,998

days it had between call-up and departing for its mobilization station. Some units reported that they would have liked more time at home station before moving to mobilization station, but it did not appear to be a significant problem. Some units were still in the process of contacting unit members to notify them of the call-up and determining the no-shows and those who were nondeployable.

In the units visited, potential no-shows and personnel who were AWOL (absent without leave) appeared to comprise two main groups of people. One group included persons who had not been attending drills and were being processed for release from the unit for various reasons. The other group included persons whom the unit was having difficulty in reaching.

For example, a week after mobilization one unit had five AWOL personnel, all of whom were in the process of being dropped from the rolls prior to the call-up but whose paperwork had not been finally approved. Another unit had 27 no-shows, potential AWOL personnel, many of whom were also members who had not been attending drills regularly and were being dropped from the rolls. The unit was

still trying to contact these personnel to ensure that they had been notified of the call-up and knew that they were supposed to report for active duty. Some unit members were in the process of responding. Two members called in while we were visiting the unit. One was on vacation with her family out of state and was preparing to depart for home to report for active duty. Another individual worked on a drilling platform in the Gulf of Mexico and had just received notice to report. He was also taking steps to report.

Based on our information, nondeployable personnel did not seem to be a significant problem during the initial phases of ODS. Some reported it as less of a problem than expected. The largest number of nondeployable personnel appeared to be those who had not completed training: officers who were early commissionees and had not yet been to the officer basic course, and enlisted personnel on split-training options who had not yet been to Advanced Individual Training.

Finally, in ODS, movement from the home station to the mobilization station was not identified as a problem.

#### **MOBILIZATION STATION USAGE**

Because of the limited call-up, the Army used only a subset of the planned mobilization stations. For example, it did not activate Camp Shelby, Camp Blanding, and other semi-active installations (some of which are state owned) during the initial phase of ODS. To activate these stations would have required more processing staff at the location than the number of reservists projected to be called and processed at the site.<sup>6</sup> As a result, some units mobilized at stations other than those originally planned. Although not planned in detail,

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<sup>6</sup>Had the semi-active sites been used, base operations support, that is, the personnel and financial resources to operate the installation, could have created some problems. Obviously, the semi-active installations are resourced for their "normal" level of operation. Were they to have been used as mobilization stations, even on a limited basis, they would have had to increase the level of base operations support. Health Services Command (HSC), for example, is responsible for providing health services to these installations. To provide health services for the semi-active sites would have caused HSC to cross level its resources, request assistance in terms of reserve component support, or investigate civilian contract options, or to employ a combination of those courses of action.

the process seemed to work well in this case. There is the potential, however, for problems because prepositioned data on personnel, training requirements, and so forth would be at the wrong location. In addition, Mobilization Assistance Teams (MATs) familiar with the mobilizing units and other personnel with expertise to provide training and support for validation might not be at the proper installation.

It appears that a more flexible plan needs to be developed to use fewer mobilization stations for small contingencies. The overall policy of mobilization station assignment as a function of contingency priority and size needs to be reviewed. Fewer stations may be adequate for even a wide range of potential scenarios. Reliance on active installations for contingencies would simplify execution of limited call-ups.

#### **MOBILIZATION STATION RESOURCE PLANNING AND CAPABILITY**

The various mobilization stations had differing views of contracting authorization and supply/financial accountability under 200K, as opposed to what they would have expected under a partial mobilization after declaration of national emergency. Some apparently chose to spend, assuming that they would be reimbursed, while others refused authorizations until they got the proper account information.

There were also significant differences in the resources available at the various installations as a result of the way the deployment unfolded. Fort Polk, for example, deployed little of its active-duty force and thus had sufficient resources to support the call-up of reserve forces. Fort Stewart, however, deployed all of the 24th Infantry Division (ID), leaving the installation with little capability to mobilize reserve forces. Reserve forces units had been planned to augment Fort Stewart in the event of a mobilization, and selected elements were called up during ODS to provide Fort Stewart with support for the mobilizing reserve units.

Fort Bragg was a different case entirely. While many of the active force elements (the 82nd Airborne Division, elements of the XVIII Airborne Corps, and its Corps Support Command) did deploy from

Fort Bragg, there was some residual capability left. Unlike Fort Stewart, there had been no plan to augment Fort Bragg in a contingency or mobilization, nor had augmentation units been put in the structure for that purpose. Previously, it had been assumed that the XVIII Airborne Corps and most of the units at Fort Bragg would still be there when the reserve units began arriving and would not deploy until sufficient reserve elements had arrived to provide continuing capability. In ODS, this was not the case. Fort Bragg, then, was better situated than Fort Stewart in some respects, but it was not as well off as Fort Polk, and, unlike Fort Stewart, units had not been preidentified to augment Fort Bragg under these circumstances. At Fort Bragg, for example, the unit that would normally have provided single-vision eye glasses and optical inserts for protective masks for reserve personnel deployed to the theater before the reserve units arrived. This slowed the processing of incoming reserve personnel.

Resources at the mobilization stations were not a significant constraint on mobilizing and deploying RC units in the initial phases of ODS. Ranges and facilities were not stressed because the number of RC personnel at any one mobilization station was relatively small. A larger call-up or a different mix of units might have presented a different case, however. Some combinations of combat units or selected CS units might have stressed ranges and facilities, particularly in cases where the AC force was still present trying to accelerate its own training in preparation for deployment. Some locations were experiencing shortages in certain sizes of desert camouflage uniforms (DCUs), NBC equipment,<sup>7</sup> eye glasses, etc., and in one case there was a shortage of personal equipment and weapons for filler personnel. Some officials were concerned about the capability to provide dental treatment and medical exams, especially physicals for personnel over 40 years of age. (While not a constraint during the initial phases of ODS, it should be noted that physical exam and dental treatment capacity did become a problem when the combat brigades were called in a later phase. This may indicate that the lack of significant problems during the early phase may have been due to the small numbers of personnel being processed at any one location.)

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<sup>7</sup>NBC (nuclear, biological, and chemical) equipment includes protective masks and gear, etc.

As shown in each of these areas, an issue for future analysis is to determine what policies and procedures are needed to ensure that necessary resources are present at the mobilization stations to support contingency operations. The Army needs plans to accommodate limitations imposed by a 200K call-up, as opposed to provisions under a declaration of national emergency and a partial mobilization.

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## **TRAINING AND VALIDATION OF UNITS**

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All Army units must be "validated" before they can deploy. The validation process includes an evaluation of personnel, logistics, and training. The purpose of validation is to determine a unit's ability to perform its assigned wartime mission when it is scheduled to deploy and to ensure that a unit not able to meet the minimum deployment criteria is not deployed without the prior approval of the gaining CINC (commander in chief). Usually, a unit that is C-3 or higher in personnel, equipment, and training is deemed mission-ready for deployment.<sup>1</sup> If a unit is not validated as ready, the unit's deployment date may be deferred, or the gaining CINC must agree to take the unit in a less than mission-ready state. For example, if a military police (MP) unit is C-4 for personnel and therefore not validated for deployment, the CINC may decide that some MPs are better than none and it is preferable to take them now rather than to wait for them to be brought up to C-3 status.

### **MANAGEMENT**

For units not commanded by a general officer, validation is the responsibility of the mobilization station installation commander.<sup>2</sup> During normal peacetime operations, the installation commander reports directly to the major command to which the installation is

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<sup>1</sup>In ODS/S, combat support and combat service support units were deployable at C-3. Combat units were required to be C-1 before they were considered deployable.

<sup>2</sup>For general officer commands, validation is the responsibility of the corps or the CONUSA.

assigned. This might be FORSCOM, TRADOC (Training and Doctrine Command), or any of the other major commands that own installations. But under partial or full mobilization, operational control for mobilization and validation (except for Health Services Command and Special Operations Forces) is "chopped" to the CONUSA, which, in turn, reports to FORSCOM as one of its subordinate commands. During ODS, with only a 200K call-up authority in effect, it was unclear to whom the installation commander was supposed to report. Most of the mobilization sites had their usual active-duty units present with each chain of command needing to report to its major command. RC mobilization activities, however, needed to be reported through the cognizant CONUSA. This problem only persisted for a short time and apparently had no serious effect. The CONUSAs were given operational control of mobilization activities of RC units, and normal command relationships were retained by AC units. These command relationships should be reviewed to deal explicitly with low-level contingency call-up situations.

To support the installation's mobilization activities, the cognizant CONUSAs form MATs for each installation. These teams are composed of mostly active-duty personnel from CONUSAs and the readiness groups. Their roles varied widely at the different mobilization stations we visited. At Fort Polk and Fort Ord, where there were full active-duty divisions present, the installation commander requested that no MAT be sent and used only garrison and division personnel to support the mobilization and validation process. At each division, one of the brigade commanders headed the validation activity. At the other extreme, Fort Bragg, where both the division and the corps had deployed, the MAT essentially ran all of the validation and training activities. At other locations, duties were shared in various ways. Except for the apparent variation in validation criteria, which will be discussed below, these differences in roles did not seem to present any serious problems.

## **VALIDATION CRITERIA AND TRAINING REQUIREMENTS**

The criteria for validating mission equipment readiness, personnel strength, status of personnel records, and medical readiness are straightforward and, in the main, well understood. Guidance had been issued by CENTCOM and FORSCOM about special personal

equipment required for ODS. This equipment included such items as DCUs, chemical protective gear, and so forth.

The training readiness requirements, on the other hand, were less clear. Both CENTCOM and FORSCOM gave some guidance as to the minimum individual soldier skills that needed to be covered. This minimum included such training as NBC refresher training, desert survival training, and training in Saudi culture and customs. Beyond these minimums, training and validation requirements were left to the mobilization station commander to determine. Each mobilization station developed its own program of common skills training, and, as would have been expected, there was some variation among the installations. Each of the mobilization stations expanded on the guidance to ensure that additional individual training was provided. These additional training tasks included, for example, radio-telephone operation procedures and map reading. The number of common soldier tasks varied from 17 to 27 across the stations we observed. Each station also required some live firing of individual weapons, but this varied from just zeroing the weapon to full marksmanship qualification and firing in chemical protective clothing. Some stations required activities using other weapons as well, including firing higher-caliber machine guns and light antitank weapons and familiarization with mines. Each station provided some desert combat orientation.

The biggest variation in requirements was in the mission and collective training area. On the one hand, some of the personnel involved in the validation process expressed the view that the RC commanders tended to overestimate the readiness of their units and to underestimate the time it would take to train them up. On the other hand, a director of training at one of the CONUSAs expressed the opinion that the validation criteria at some mobilization stations were too stringent. The validation criteria did vary widely. At one location, a chemical decontamination unit was held past its initial validation date to continue collective training. At another installation, a truck company was to be validated even though its personnel did not have experience in driving their trucks or firing their weapons in chemical protective gear or driving at night in a lights-out condition. We did not find any case, however, where a unit missed its deployment date because of lack of training readiness.



Mobilization training and validation times are key variables in planning the role of the RC in future Army contingency scenarios and in making force structure decisions. To analyze those times and hence to define what role the RC should play in future contingencies, the Army needs to specify more definite criteria for assessing training readiness and validating units.

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**RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS ISSUES**

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ODS occasioned the first call-up of RC forces in more than twenty years. During the initial phase (increments 1, 2, and 3a), the Army called up more than 22,000 RC personnel, representing 221 units, to be deployed overseas or used to fill CONUS slots vacated by deploying AC units. The RC units mobilized were unit types devoted to critical support functions, such as military police, chemical, transportation, linguistic, medical, ordnance, and quartermaster units. In some cases the appropriate unit types exist only in the RC. Because the initial phase of future contingencies may entail similar requirements for reserve forces, it is worthwhile to examine the ODS mobilization experience to see what lessons it may hold.

In this section, we summarize those observations and highlight a set of key RC issues that are likely to be important for the future Army. We caution that, particularly in the case of RC forces, the information used in this assessment was from a limited set of units called up during the initial phase of ODS/S. During the period of observation, many of the RC units that had been called up were still in the mobilization pipeline, and few had reached the deployment stage. Necessarily then, our discussion focuses on the mobilization process in CONUS and the aspects of that process that could bear on the Army's ability to use RC units early in future contingencies. The discussion is relevant to the initial phases of a limited mobilization for contingency operations, not for a full mobilization like that previously envisioned for a large-scale conflict in Europe. We believe that the former rather than the latter should be used to frame the mobilization process for the future.

## **DESERT SHIELD DEPARTURES FROM PAST RESERVE PLANNING**

Over the past two decades, most Army planning for use of RC units has been based on the possibility of a large-scale conflict. In the context of DoD's Total Force Policy, the expectation has been that RC units would deploy along with AC units early in any major contingency, particularly in a European conflict. Typically, planners focused on scenarios with relatively long warning times, permitting a sequence of mobilization actions including the presidential 200K call-up followed by partial mobilization and then full mobilization. Finally, based on these assumptions many RC units have developed stable training and affiliation relationships with AC units—for example, executing their two-week annual training program at the installation housing their affiliated AC unit, with which they expected to “go to war.”

As events unfolded, however, ODS did not follow this path. There was little warning, there was no specific plan for such a contingency, and there was no call-up or mobilization authority at the time deployment was initiated. Combat and certain support units were needed in theater very early. Given the speed with which the theater needed combat power, RC combat units were not used; sufficient combat forces were available from the AC. Support units—some of which could only be found in the RC—and individual reservists with specialized skills were also needed, however. These requirements led to a presidential order calling up a limited number of RC troops under the 200K authority, but the nation did not immediately proceed to any other stage of mobilization.

The ODS pattern of events thus differed from the expectations embedded in plans for other scenarios. On the whole, these unexpected events did not impede the mobilization of RC units that were called. Our own limited observations, combined with the reports we have received from others, suggest that the initial phase of the mobilization proceeded fairly smoothly and there were no significant delays in RC unit availability. However, the ODS departures from previous planning bring several immediate issues about the RC into sharper focus and raise some longer-term issues about designing a future Army capable of quick response to a range of contingencies.

## **DIRECT IMPLICATIONS AND ISSUES GROWING OUT OF ODS**

### **Special Treatment of Very Early Deploying RC Units**

The Army needed to call some RC units very early in the deployment, primarily specialists such as port operators, linguists, and medical and water purification personnel. Some have suggested that from a readiness perspective it would be desirable to have all very early deploying units in the AC; however, this may not always be possible or even desirable from a broader perspective. Some types of capability may be very expensive to maintain in the active force, where the combination of peacetime training requirements and peacetime work load demands would not keep the units occupied on a full-time basis (water purification and mortuary affairs are examples). In other cases, the skills required may be more easily maintained in the civil sector; examples are medical, legal, and civil affairs. Finally, some skills may be very scenario dependent and not suitable for being fully in the AC. Linguists are an example of this last category.

Thus, for some scenarios or requirements it may be necessary to take special steps to resource particular RC units or particular skills in RC units at a higher level in order to ensure a sufficient readiness level. In addition to special treatment in terms of resources, it may also be useful to consider special legislative or procedural changes to permit the use of such units without some of the constraints that applied to ODS. Different organizational structures and "dual hatting" relationships may also offer enhancements to the early availability and readiness of particular units or parts of units (such as was the case in ODS for linguists and medical personnel).

### **Flexibility and Expectations in Use of RC Units**

ODS revealed significant differences between widely held and fixed expectations about RC roles and the role the RC actually played in this contingency. The past planning focus on Europe and other large-scale conflicts created a public expectation, inside and outside the Army, that any contingency calling for the deployment of forces would automatically involve the use of RC units. ODS resulted in some of those expectations not being realized. Numerous observers noted that many RC units, especially combat units, did not deploy

with AC units as expected, that in some cases parts of units were called, and that units were used in ways that were different from what they had planned and trained for. These changes prompted widespread concern within the RC and led to considerable public criticism of the call-up decisions. Of course, departures from a deliberate plan will always occur, given the specific circumstances of any contingency. However, unmet expectations, whether rightly held or not, may have such implications as adverse effects on future retention and recruiting efforts.

If Army missions undergo great change over the next few years, as many believe they will, it will be important to create the right set of expectations and to keep relevant parties informed when circumstances change the assumptions underlying those expectations. For example, the Army needs to prepare unit members, both active and reserve, for a range of scenarios and to convey the concept that training and unit relationships in peacetime may be changed in a contingency. More generally, if future contingencies resemble ODS it will be more important to place a premium on flexibility and to inculcate that concept as a key element of Army training for both the reserve and active forces.

### **Reviewing the 200K Call-up Mechanism**

Many of the initial problems that did occur in the ODS call-up were related to previous plans' concentration on partial and full mobilization. Most of the documents in the FORSCOM Mobilization and Deployment Planning System describe procedures for a 200K call-up as a precursor to partial mobilization. As a result, during the call-up there was some early but short-lived confusion, although it did not appear to slow the call-up or force deployment. Nevertheless, for a future contingency this might not be the case. If future planning determines a role for RC units early in the deployment of forces under the limited 200K call-up authority, the Army should review policies and procedures based on the experience from ODS.

Some of the problems posed by the 200K authority are related to administrative and legal procedures that presuppose authority not included in the 200K provisions, or that presuppose a declaration of national emergency. Examples of the former include pay and benefit differences based on the 90-day active-duty period specified in the

call-up orders as compared with the two-year period for mobilization. Many of the existing personnel and administrative procedures for mobilization are tailored to the expectation of a longer period of service and may not be appropriate for shorter expected periods of service. Certain contracting and procurement actions are facilitated under a declaration of national emergency, as compared with the call-up authority.

Presently, there is no clear authority and procedure to utilize retired or Individual Ready Reserve (IRR)<sup>1</sup> personnel to augment RC (or AC) units during the alert and call-up process. This would offer a significant addition to the cross-leveling process used in ODS; in particular, it might alleviate some of the concern about "breaking" some units to fix others and avoid the risk that the broken unit might be required in a future increment of the call-up. Mechanisms for using volunteers might also be modified to improve the readiness status of RC units during a call-up; this was done in ODS but was not managed in a systematic way. For future contingencies, more flexible arrangements and planning might offer sizable benefits.

In addition, there may be opportunities to streamline or make more effective the use of resources where a limited number of units are being called, as opposed to a partial or full mobilization where virtually all units would be mobilized in a short period of time. Although all mobilization stations were not used in ODS, it was observed that even a smaller number might have been more effective if the planning and preparation had been accomplished in advance. The Army would benefit from greater flexibility to tailor the number of mobilization stations, mobilization training, and the validation process to a particular contingency.

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<sup>1</sup>The IRR consists of Ready Reserve personnel not assigned to the Selected Reserve and not on active duty. They, for the most part, are individuals who have separated from the AC before completing their 8-year military service obligation. These individuals cannot be mobilized without a declaration of war or national emergency. During a later phase of ODS, partial mobilization was declared and members of the IRR were called to active duty.

### **Premobilization Measures to Reduce Assembly and Movement Time**

During ODS, it was reported that some units could have benefited from additional training and practice in the process of mobilization and deployment. In other cases, units could have been better prepared for ODS if they had completed certain routine preparatory actions before being called up. Such things as over-40 physicals, eye glasses, and dental treatment should be given greater emphasis in pe etime so they do not become bottlenecks after a call-up, when time and resources will be more limited. A review of this issue should also identify activities that might better be postponed until arrival at a mobilization station rather than being done during regular drill periods. For example, certain scenario-specific training, such as familiarization with terrain and climate conditions, is probably best done during mobilization.

It may also be beneficial to consider initiatives to reduce the number of nondeployable personnel and the effects of these personnel on unit capability. While our observations are not based on systematic data, in the units we visited, many nondeployable personnel had not completed initial training. This problem is a direct result of trainees and students in the RC who have not completed initial training being counted on unit rosters. If the RC is to play a role in future contingencies, it will be necessary to establish policies or procedures to offset unit personnel who have not yet been trained and who therefore are not deployable, as is done in the AC through an individual account. The magnitude of this problem and the potential benefit of such solutions require further analysis.

### **Training Activities at Mobilization Station**

One of the observations from ODS has been the variation in training given to the RC units at their respective mobilization stations. While some variation might be expected, training appeared to be driven primarily by the resources available at a particular mobilization station or the view or predilection of the personnel overseeing the training.

One issue is whether more systematic planning and guidance could assist in ensuring that the set of training activities appropriate to the

circumstance was in fact accomplished before validation. In ODS, there were significant differences in the set of "minimum" training activities required of units prior to deployment, and the differences were not explained by the following factors: the type of unit, where it was to be employed, training status, and the degree of risk assumed in the particular contingency. Guidelines for postmobilization training activities should be based on these factors.

We also observed a lack of systematic means for assessing the adequacy of stocks, mobilization personnel, ranges, and facilities at the mobilization stations for varying sizes and characteristics of scenarios (e.g., size of units being mobilized, type of unit, and presence of an AC unit on-site).

### **Sustaining an Extended Deployment Requirement**

During the early phase of ODS, concern was expressed that if ODS evolved into a long-term deployment of forces in the Middle East and if partial mobilization was not declared, the role of the RC in sustaining the forces in the theater would become an issue. Under the 200K call-up, RC personnel could only remain on active duty for up to 180 days. What then? Would it have been appropriate to call up additional RC units to replace those that had returned and had separated from active duty? In some cases there were not sufficient units of the correct type to replace those already in the theater. The issue of replacing these units became more pressing as time passed. For ODS, partial mobilization was declared, thereby avoiding this problem. For future contingencies, however, the Army should examine the role of RC units in maintaining forward-deployed forces over an extended period of time and the adequacy of existing mechanisms to support such a role.

### **Personnel and Family Support Issues**

Personnel issues identified in the initial phases of ODS were primarily associated with the pay and benefits accorded reserve personnel called up under the 200K authority, as compared to those for volunteers or for people who might be called up under a partial mobilization. For example, job protection and return rights for individuals who volunteer are perceived by some to be different from



those for individuals who are called up or mobilized. Some elements of pay and benefits are different under call-up because of the length of the active period of service. To be eligible for the variable housing allowance, an individual must be ordered to active duty for a period of 140 days or more. Eligibility for dental insurance accorded active duty personnel requires a period of service of one year. These and other pay and benefit issues need to be changed if the Army is to depend on the use of RC personnel in future contingencies, either on a voluntary or involuntary basis, under situations short of partial mobilization.

Family support seemed to work well. Units established family support groups. Some states, using state funds, activated their State Area Command (STARC), which would normally be mobilized in federal service in the event of a partial or full mobilization to provide family support services. This is an area that could become an issue in future contingencies with extensive casualties or during protracted deployments.

### **LONGER-TERM ISSUES FOR THE FUTURE ARMY**

The above issues are primarily focused on the capability of today's Army to respond to a contingency like ODS. The future Army, however, is likely to be very different in size and composition and must be prepared to respond to a range of contingencies beyond ODS-like contingencies. These factors give rise to other, more long-term issues.

#### **Planning for a Downsized Army**

The early stages of ODS mobilization were executed with few problems in part because ODS was mounted from an Army with about 744,000 personnel in the AC and 756,000 in the RC. However, the Army in the future will be smaller and perhaps less robust in its capability in terms of the number of units of a particular type. The Army in ODS, while possibly not configured exactly as might have been desired, did have the benefit of being able to draw from a large pool of units, AC and RC, to meet its requirements.

The size of the Army helped ODS execution in at least two important ways. First, the Army could choose among units to select those that

were most ready, or those whose capability best matched the requirement. Second, the Army had the opportunity to cross level among units, with the potential in some cases of drawing resources from a large number of sources. In the future, the number of units, the number of personnel, and possibly the amount of equipment will be smaller. For a contingency Army, this has a number of implications that need to be considered, such as different strategies for resourcing units. For early deploying RC units, this may include more full-time manning, additional training days, bonuses paid by unit or skill, or other departures from today's practice.

### **Planning for Use of Reserve Forces in Future Contingencies**

We have commented above on the fact that for more than forty years military planning was influenced primarily by scenarios for a European war or other large-scale conflict, a situation that proved very different from the circumstances of ODS. However, ODS is only one of many contingencies for which the Army may need to prepare. A different scenario or contingency may impose quite different demands on the Army and its ability to deliver forces. As the United States moves into an era with changing defense requirements and constrained resources, the Army needs to systematically consider the range of such scenarios and the demands they may impose on both the RC and AC forces.

ODS experience suggests that planning for the role of reserve forces (combat, combat support, and combat service support) in future contingencies should explicitly consider a variety of factors that affect reserve planning. For example, such factors include: (1) likely theater force requirements, by unit type; (2) required date in theater (or in CONUS, if the unit is being used to backfill or provide CONUS support); (3) date and type of mobilization authorized; and (4) likely duration of the contingency. Factors (1) and (2) have previously been considered in the deliberate planning for large scenarios, but they should also be included in the planning for smaller contingencies. Close analysis of such requirements, and the ability of reserve forces to meet them, will be important in designing a future Army structure that can meet contingency requirements, preserve a capability to respond to a long-warning major conflict, and still remain within peacetime resource constraints.

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